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Abstract
In this paper we explore quarantining as a more ethical method for delimiting the spread of Hate Speech via online social 
media platforms. Currently, companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google generally respond reactively to such material: 
offensive messages that have already been posted are reviewed by human moderators if complaints from users are received. 
The offensive posts are only subsequently removed if the complaints are upheld; therefore, they still cause the recipients 
psychological harm. In addition, this approach has frequently been criticised for delimiting freedom of expression, since it 
requires the service providers to elaborate and implement censorship regimes. In the last few years, an emerging generation of 
automatic Hate Speech detection systems has started to offer new strategies for dealing with this particular kind of offensive 
online material. Anticipating the future efficacy of such systems, the present article advocates an approach to online Hate 
Speech detection that is analogous to the quarantining of malicious computer software. If a given post is automatically clas-
sified as being harmful in a reliable manner, then it can be temporarily quarantined, and the direct recipients can receive an 
alert, which protects them from the harmful content in the first instance. The quarantining framework is an example of more 
ethical online safety technology that can be extended to the handling of Hate Speech. Crucially, it provides flexible options 
for obtaining a more justifiable balance between freedom of expression and appropriate censorship.
Keywords Hate speech · Social media · Ethical AI · Quarantining · Freedom of expression
Introduction
In recent years, the automatic detection of online Hate 
Speech (HS), and offensive language more generally, has 
become an active research topic in machine learning (David-
son et al. 2017; Schmidt and Wiegand 2017a, b; Fortuna 
and Nunes 2018). This has been prompted by increasing 
anxieties about the prevalence of HS on social media, and 
the psychological and societal harms that offensive mes-
sages can cause (Gelber and McNamara 2016; Judge and 
Nel 2018). In many respects, the core concerns underlying 
these developments are ancient ones. Harmful language 
(of various kinds) has been deemed problematical since 
at least the Old Testament, and philosophers as diverse as 
Aristotle, John Locke, Spinoza, Voltaire, Charles de Sec-
ondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Karl Friedrich Bahrdt, and, 
perhaps most famously, John Stuart Mill, have all reflected 
at length upon the implications of restricting free speech 
(for example, Aristotle 1984 [1782]; see also Britt 2010). 
While the specific concept of HS had already emerged by 
the 1940s, the social tensions in Western democracies cre-
ated by increasing multi- and interculturalism from the mid 
twentieth century onwards led to the gradual introduction 
of HS-related legislation (Brown 2015, p. 182). The post-
9/11 preoccupation with anti-terrorism initiatives brought a 
new urgency to such considerations, and recent authoritative 
monographs such as Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGow-
an’s Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech 
(Maitra and McGowan 2012), Jeremy Waldron’s The Harm 
in Hate Speech (Waldron 2012), Alex Brown’s Hate Speech 
Law: A Philosophical Examination (Brown 2015), and Eric 
Heinze’s Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Heinze 
2016) have explored a wide range of practical and theoretical 
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concerns about how HS could and should be managed in 
liberal democracies. Some theorists, like Ronald Dworkin, 
have argued robustly that ‘the coercive powers of the state’ 
should be resisted even when manifest in the form of HS 
legislation, since free speech is a fundamental condition of 
legitimate government (Dworkin 2006, p. 131). Others, like 
Mari Matsuda or Judith Butler, believe that by not issuing 
legislation against HS, injurious language is, consequently, 
protected by the state. Specifically, Matsuda speaks of the 
‘victim [of HS] becom[ing] a stateless person’ (Matsuda 
1993, p. 25), while Butler argues that ‘the state produces 
hate speech’ in the sense that.
[…] the category cannot exist without the state’s rati-
fication, and this power of the state’s judicial language 
to establish and maintain the domain of what will be 
publicly speakable suggests that the state plays much 
more than a limiting function in such decisions; in 
fact, the state actively produces the domain of publicly 
acceptable speech, demarcating the line between the 
domains of the speakable and the unspeakable, and 
retaining the power to make and sustain that conse-
quential line of demarcation. (Butler 1997, pp. 76–77; 
emphasis in original)
In the Western world, most nations now impose penalties 
for some forms of expression deemed hateful because of 
their content, and such approaches thereby institutionalise 
value pluralism: the relevant legislative bodies restrict the 
freedoms of certain citizens so that the interests and well-
being of others can be safeguarded (Galston 1999).1 Self-
evidently, these are areas where political philosophy and 
ethics become inextricably intertwined.
Over the last decade, though, the rapid rise of social 
media has created new forms of swift and efficient com-
munication in which HS can be expressed almost instan-
taneously online, and often anonymously. Recognising the 
non-trivial problems this creates, social media providers and 
video-sharing platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and 
Twitter have developed internal policies for HS regulation, 
and they also signed a Code of Conduct agreement with 
the European Commission (2019). At present, such deci-
sions are taken at the corporate level, rather than the state 
level, which means that the companies concerned essentially 
regulate themselves. While there have recently been recom-
mendations for state-level regulators, the infrastructures 
proposed tend to be very high-level. For instance, the UK 
government has outlined enforcement powers that a regula-
tor could use against companies that failed to fulfil their duty 
of care (HM Government 2019, pp. 41–52). Once again, 
though, such methods are inherently reactive, and this is a 
problem because it means that the harm has already been 
inflicted. In practice, the task of handling online HS involves 
large numbers of moderators (c 15k in the case of Facebook) 
checking the content of posts identified by users as being 
offensive. The slow and laborious nature of this inherently 
responsive system has motivated the conviction that auto-
mated systems are required to detect such material. And the 
need to define HS more precisely for these purposes (e.g., 
so that training data can be annotated accurately) has further 
emphasised the ambiguities inherent in the very phrase ‘Hate 
Speech’. The kinds of utterances so classified vary consider-
ably internationally, largely because HS laws take a vari-
ety of different forms depending upon the legal definitions 
adopted in different countries. It is also widely-recognised 
that the legislative focus on specific protected characteristics 
(e.g., race, gender, religion) has the undesirable consequence 
of excluding other vulnerable groups. For instance, since 
being an immigrant does not involve any of the protected 
characteristics recognised by UK law, threatening language 
directed towards immigrants cannot (strictly) be classified 
as HS, though it may still constitute a crime. This is why 
Facebook’s public-facing ‘Community Standards’ docu-
ment has recently been updated to indicate that the com-
pany’s approach to HS overtly provides ‘some protections 
for immigration status’ (Facebook 2019a). Nonetheless, dis-
satisfactions with the prevailing arbitrariness and relativism 
of the many different definitions of HS, as well as concerns 
about its emphasis on the specific emotion of ‘hatred’, have 
prompted some researchers to propose alternative categories 
such as ‘Extreme Speech’ or ‘Dangerous Speech’ (Hare and 
Weinstein 2009; Benesch 2019). Nonetheless, the phrase 
‘Hate Speech’ remains the most prominent alternative, and 
therefore it will be used (with reservations) in the ensuing 
discussion. We will interpret the phrase broadly, essentially 
in the same manner as Paula Fortuna and Sérgio Nunes:
Hate speech is language that attacks or diminishes, 
that incites violence or hate against groups, based on 
specific characteristics such as physical appearance, 
religion, descent, national or ethnic origin, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity or other, and it can occur with 
different linguistic styles, even in subtle forms or when 
humour is used. (Fortuna and Nunes 2018, p. 5)
The remaining sections of this article briefly summarise 
the current conventions for the regulation of online HS, 
before considering some of the ways in which the automatic 
detection of HS could be used to safeguard citizens within 
liberal democracies in a more ethical manner. While previ-
ous research in this area has focused primarily on the core 
task of developing automated methods for detecting HS, this 
article probes instead the way in which such technologies 
1 The most notable exception being the United States of America, 
which currently has no HS legislation because of the concern that it 
would contravene the First Amendment.
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could be used as part of a larger infrastructure that moder-
ates the content of social media posts in a way that does 
not excessively compromise freedom of expression. In 
particular, the method of quarantining is recommended as 
a particularly effective way of avoiding the problematical 
extremes of entirely unregulated free speech or coercively 
authoritarian censorship.
The regulation of online hate speech
As mentioned above, in response to growing public con-
cerns about HS, most social media platforms have adopted 
self-imposed definitions, guidelines, and policies for dealing 
with this particular kind of offensive language. Continued 
criticism of these procedures, however, suggests that such an 
approach is far from ideal, therefore the current procedures 
adopted by Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube will be briefly 
summarised here as illustrative case-studies.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the way in which Facebook 
(FB) deals with HS if a user (S; the Sender) posts something 
(P) that another user (R; the Recipient) finds offensive.
P will therefore be manually reviewed and evaluated for 
potential hate-inciting harmful content, if reported by a user, 
otherwise, it will remain visible on the website.2 As a basis 
for deciding whether or not a post qualifies as HS, Facebook 
uses the following definition:
We define hate speech as a direct attack on people 
based on what we call protected characteristics—race, 
ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual 
orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity and 
serious disease or disability. We also provide some 
protections for immigration status. We define “attack” 
as violent or dehumanising speech, statements of infe-
riority, or calls for exclusion or segregation. (Facebook 
2019b)
Additional factors are the context of the comment, cul-
tural norms (e.g., language, country), the genre/style of the 
comment (e.g., humour, satire), or if a post was reproduced 
as a means of criticism and opposition (Allan 2017). Yet the 
moderation process is subject to constant revision and modi-
fication. On 28th March 2019, Facebook announced that it 
would block and remove white supremacist content. The 
decision followed heavy criticism after a live-stream of a ter-
rorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, had been made 
available on the social media platform. New Zealand’s Prime 
Minister Jacinda Ardern reacted saying that social media 
sites were ‘the publisher, not just the postman’ of extremist 
content online (BBC News 2019). Facebook’s decision to 
take a proactive stance against the spreading of nationalist 
and extremist material has important consequences for HS 
regulation on social media more generally. Nevertheless, the 
company’s methods for handling HS continue to be primar-
ily reactive rather than proactive.
Twitter has also been criticised repeatedly for its HS-
related procedures. While its policy on ‘hateful conduct’ 
tells its users they are not permitted to ‘promote violence 
against or directly attack or threaten other people on the 
Fig. 1  Facebook’s current HS 
regulation procedure (adapted 
from Allan 2017)
S posts P on FB R reads P and finds it offensive R reports P to FB
FB receives an alert P referred to FB's moderators
P is assessed by 
moderators according 
to FB's policy
Decision
• P not idenfied as HS; 
remains on website
• P idenfied as HS; removed 
from website
2 Approximately 15,000 content moderators currently work for Face-
book (see Newton 2019).
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basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, 
gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, 
or serious disease’, critics have pointed out that this guide-
line is both inconsistent and ineffective, and does not protect 
groups from harassment (Twitter 2019; Matsakis 2018). One 
source of inconsistency is that Twitter, like Facebook, still 
relies primarily on manual and human-led HS detection and 
assessment. In a recent attempt to offer its users even greater 
protection from online harassment and abuse, the company 
announced a new policy prohibiting ‘dehumanising speech’, 
which it defines as:
Language that treats others as less than human. Dehu-
manization can occur when others are denied of human 
qualities (animalistic dehumanization) or when others 
are denied of their human nature (mechanistic dehu-
manization). Examples can include comparing groups 
to animals and viruses (animalistic), or reducing 
groups to a tool for some other purpose (mechanistic). 
(Gadde and Harvey 2018)
The policy further states that it applies to ‘[a]ny group 
of people that can be distinguished by their shared charac-
teristics such as their race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual 
orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, 
disability, serious disease, occupation, political beliefs, loca-
tion, or social practices’ (Gadde and Harvey 2018).
Further, Twitter has recently added an intermittent feature 
that blocks potentially sensitive image-based material (simi-
lar to Instagram’s sensitive content filter), and which sends 
the intended recipient a warning. The recipient can then 
either choose to view the content, or decide to block it (see 
Fig. 2). In addition, users can also flag their own tweets as 
potentially containing sensitive material (see Fig. 3). While 
this feature currently functions in a somewhat arbitrary man-
ner, the underlying approach clearly has the potential to be 
deployed against HS, as discussed in “The automatic detec-
tion and classification of hate speech” section. It is worth 
mentioning that the social news and discussion platform 
Reddit implemented a ‘quarantine function’ in 2015, which 
allows for content and entire communities to be put in quar-
antine. Content will only be released again after success-
ful appeal (Reddit 2019), and, once again, this procedure 
involves careful evaluation by a human administrator.
Finally, since its emergence in 2005, YouTube has devel-
oped from being a merely video-sharing site to being an 
influential source of news, information, and entertainment 
for users worldwide. In recent years, it has provided a power-
ful platform for those who have sought to spread conspiracy 
theories (e.g. anti-vaccine), extremist views, and misinfor-
mation (see, e.g., Uscinski et al. 2018; Ottoni et al. 2018). 
Like Facebook and Twitter, YouTube relies on the reporting 
of dangerous or abusive content by already-offended users, 
and all such reports are subjected to qualitative review. Its 
‘Hate Speech Policy’ (Google 2019) currently lists specific 
protected characteristics (11 in total, including ‘veteran sta-
tus’), and a reporting tool is provided that can be used to 
raise concerns about videos, comments, or even whole chan-
nels that promote HS.3
The automatic detection and classification of hate 
speech
Given the brisk summaries in the previous section, it should 
be obvious why, in the last few years, the automatic detec-
tion of HS has become an active research priority. The vari-
ous systems developed so far frequently adopt a binary clas-
sification framework: given a social media post P (e.g., a 
tweet), the system should classify P either as constituting HS 
or as not constituting HS. Consequently, Precision, Recall, 
and Accuracy are regularly used as metrics for determin-
ing system performance. For instance, Warner and Hirsh-
berg (2012) developed a system that classified statements 
as being anti-Semitic or not, while Nobata et al. (2016) and 
Gao et al. (2017) used the categories ‘abusive’ or ‘clean’ 
instead. Since the precise nature of the task and the datasets 
used often varies from publication to publication, numer-
ous classification strategies have been deployed (see Fortuna 
and Nunes 2018 for an overview) but comparing them in 
Fig. 2  Warning of potentially sensitive material on Twitter. Sourcehttps 
://twitt er.com
Fig. 3  Default settings for the display of potentially sensitive content 
on Twitter. Source https ://twitt er.com/setti ngs/safet y
3 The reporting tools can be found here: https ://suppo rt.googl e.com/
youtu be/answe r/28020 27.
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a meaningful manner is not always easy. While early sys-
tems tended to rely on basic word filters and simple syn-
tactic structures to identify offensive language, more recent 
systems have sought to incorporate extra-linguistic knowl-
edge-based features, as well as contextual information, to 
achieve more accurate detection and better classification 
rates. Even sociolinguistic features concerning the user’s 
background, posting history, and online characteristics have 
been included in the development and training of classifi-
ers (e.g., Dadvar et al. 2013; Schmidt and Wiegand 2017a). 
To consider just a few examples in greater detail, Davidson 
et al. (2017) used logistic regression with L1 regularization 
to reduce the dimensionality of the data, and they favoured 
a ternary classification framework in which each tweet was 
identified as constituting offensive language or not, with all 
offensive tweets subsequently being classified as constitut-
ing HS or not. Their dataset of 25 k tweets had been manu-
ally labelled (via CrowdFlower), and using Accuracy as a 
scoring metric, they found that 91% of the offensive tweets 
were being correctly identified, but only 60% of the HS (i.e., 
only slightly better than random chance). By contrast, Qian 
et al. (2018) used a Conditional Variational Autoencoder 
(CVAE) to distinguish among 40 hate groups with 13 dif-
ferent hate group ideologies, using a dataset of 3.5 million 
tweets. Consequently, each tweet was associated with a spe-
cific hate category label (e.g., ‘ACT for America’) and a 
specific hate speech label (e.g., white nationalist, anti-immi-
gration). This fine-grained approach enables more specific 
sub-classifications of HS posts, but it depends on there being 
enough data associated with each sub-type. In recent years, 
the application of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) 
has produced higher Precision results in many HS-related 
tasks (e.g., Gambäck and Sidkar 2017).
Nonetheless, despite the many technical advances, there 
remain persistent difficulties concerning the annotation of 
HS-related training data. As noted above, different research-
ers focus on different tasks (e.g., anti-Semitic language [i.e., 
a specific subset of HS], abusive language [i.e., a superset of 
HS]). Therefore, they use different datasets, and it is often 
very difficult to compare and contrast the performance of the 
various systems. This lack of commonly-accepted training 
and test datasets has significantly hampered system devel-
opment. There are also problems when it comes to label-
ling the data. The task of classifying millions of offensive 
tweets is usually crowd sourced (for practical reasons), yet 
it is hard to guarantee quality control using that method. 
The subjectivity of annotators remains problematical, and 
it arises from diverging perceptions of what constitutes HS. 
This divergence is a factor even when particular definitions 
of HS are specified, since the perceived tone and style of a 
given social media post (e.g., humorous, satirical) can vary 
greatly. Further, there has been a growing interest in the 
manner in which users respond to HS. The various strategies 
deployed are often grouped together as instances of ‘counter 
speech’. Crucially, users have been observed to use counter 
speech of different kinds, including pointing out and cor-
recting misinformation, misrepresentations, and contradic-
tions, warning of consequences, denouncing hateful speech, 
debunking via humour or sarcasm, deploying a notably posi-
tive tone, or using hostile language (Mathew et al. 2018). 
The important role of counter speech in countering HS is 
only starting to be understood, yet it clearly influences the 
spread of online hatred and misinformation. Clearly, more 
research concerning this topic (and specifically large-scale 
studies of datasets and the development of improved clas-
sification models) is needed.
The preceding paragraphs have offered a succinct over-
view of some of the recent developments in the task of 
detecting and classifying HS automatically. As mentioned 
earlier, though, the ex post facto identification of HS does 
not undo the harm that such material has already caused 
when posted online. While effective counter speech can 
certainly contribute to decreasing that harm (Butler 1997, 
p. 14), it would be far better to intercept potentially offen-
sive posts at an earlier stage of the process, ideally before 
they have been read by the intended recipient. With this in 
mind, the following section will outline a framework for the 
automated quarantining of HS which extends an automated 
approach that has been used for several decades to decrease 
the damage caused by malware.
Quarantining hate speech
As summarised in “The regulation of online hate speech” 
section, social media o rganisations such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, and YouTube currently use teams of moderators to deter-
mine whether potentially harmful posts should be removed 
or not. The current systems rely on already-offended users 
complaining about offensive messages, and the content of 
these is then assessed by teams of people who determine 
whether or not they should be deleted. These approaches will 
be referred to here as Too Little Too Late  (TL2) methods, 
since they come into effect only after the intended harm 
has already been inflicted, both on the direct recipient of 
the message, and on any indirect recipients (including the 
thousands of human moderators who have to encounter 
hundreds of examples of disturbing material every day, see 
Newton 2019; Simon and Bowman 2019). Consequently, 
 TL2 harm-reduction strategies are problematical, especially 
if we accept that language-mediated online harm is a seri-
ous as other sub-types (e.g., physical, financial). Also, in the 
influential theory of Information Ethics that Luciano Floridi 
(Floridi 2013, Chap. 4) has elaborated over the last few dec-
ades, there is a perceived need for an ethical framework that 
is primarily patient-oriented rather than agent-oriented. In 
other words, the moral impact of a given action is at least as 
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important as the decision process the relevant agent followed 
when electing to take that action. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, reactive  TL2 approaches are undesirable, since they do 
not prevent harm being caused. Inevitably, though, any pro-
posed regulation designed to delimit harm raises familiar 
long-standing tensions between libertarian tendencies (e.g., 
freedom of expression) and more restrictive authoritarian 
ideologies/practices (e.g., censorship). These viewpoints 
have been prominent, for instance, in the important recent 
debates about HS legislation involving the legal theorists 
Dworkin (2009); Waldron (2012, 2017) and Weinstein 
(2017). The various disagreements have centred on topics 
such as whether HS bans necessarily undermine democratic 
legitimacy by depriving certain citizens of a voice in the 
political process, and diminishing their opportunity to speak 
without fear of criminal sanction. Contrasting views about 
such matters become vividly apparent in relation to online 
HS if the only available options are (i) to leave already-
posted offensive material in situ, or (ii) to remove it entirely.
Crucially, though, these are not the only two options. 
Many cultures have well-established orthographic conven-
tions for decreasing the impact of offensive written mate-
rial, to differing extents. For instance, in English-speaking 
cultures it is often possible to replace letters in potentially 
derogatory words (e.g., ethnic slurs) with other symbols to 
render them more opaque, or else to strike out the problem-
atical lexical items entirely. These are the sorts of content 
moderation methods implemented by wordfilter software in 
online chatrooms and forums (Roberts 2017). Here are some 
examples4:
1) You niggers are fucking retards 
2) You niggers are fucking retards 
3) You n*ggers are f*cking retards 
4) You niggers are fucking retards 
Examples (2) and (3) still enable the blatantly racist senti-
ment of (1) to be conveyed, but they offer different degrees 
and styles of textual censorship that (arguably) soften 
the impact of the offensive language. Option (4) is more 
extreme, since it entirely conceals the specific group targeted 
by the HS, and it merely indicates that something offensive 
had been written. These methods may be effective at the 
lexical level, but more sophisticated handling is required 
when HS is expressed in phrases or sentences that do not 
merely contain offensive words5:
(5) Yo if my son comes home & try’s 2 play with my 
daughters doll house I’m going 2 break it over his head 
& say n my voice ‘stop that’s gay’.
Simple key-word spotting would not be sufficient to 
identify the homophobic content of (5). The term ‘gay’ is 
not inherently offensive since it is regularly used in non-
pejorative ways such as ‘Gay Pride’ (unlike, for instance, 
the word ‘faggot’ when deployed as a homophobic slur). 
The import of the above tweet is only apparent at a clausal 
level, but even then the task of determining the referent of 
the demonstrative ‘that’ requires sentential-level comprehen-
sion. If the strategies in (2) above were to be deployed in this 
case, then the tweet could be modified as follows—but no 
current wordfiltering software could cope easily with such 
complex syntactic structures:
(6) Yo if my son comes home & try’s 2 play with my 
daughters doll house I’m going 2 break it over his head 
& say n my voice ‘stop that’s gay.
Examples like this highlight the subtleties involved in 
identifying and HS-related content and implementing forms 
of textual censorship (e.g., ellipses, strikethroughs) that ame-
liorate the impact of the problematical content. Given the 
complexity of the task, it is important to consider an alter-
native form of (potentially temporary) censorship—namely, 
quarantining. This approach has been commonplace in cyber 
security applications since the late 1980s, especially as a 
form of protection against malware.6 For instance, Exchange 
Online Protection (EOP) is a spam and malware filter avail-
able as part of the Exchange Online email security service 
owned by Microsoft (Kjierland and Baumgartner 2018). It 
can be set to assess whether email is spam via EOP’s own 
Spam Confidence Level ruleset and the detection scores 
assigned by the relevant email server. Any mail message 
that is ranked at a value of (say) five or above from either 
of these checks is sent to a central quarantine area, where it 
is retained for 15 days before being deleted. This is just one 
example of how quarantining is regularly deployed to protect 
users against software specifically designed and intended to 
cause particular forms of online harm (e.g., data loss, data 
theft, server failure).
Via analogy, HS can be viewed as another form of inten-
tional online harm, and therefore it too can be handled by 
means of quarantining. The analogy is less tenuous than it 
4 This example is taken from/pol/: https ://archi ve.4pleb s.org/pol/
threa d/16614 0233 (April 2018).
5 This example is a tweet by the comedian Kevin Hart (https ://varie 
ty.com/2018/film/news/kevin -hart-respo nds-homop hobic -tweet 
s-12030 83215 /). The controversy surrounded these tweets caused him 
to resign as the Oscars host in 2019.
6 Elementary quarantining methods were developed in the aftermath 
of the Morris worm in 1988 (see Nazario 2004, pp. 39–40).
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may sound initially, since online HS is sometimes generated 
by software (e.g., by Twitter bots) (Fig. 4). Therefore, when 
considered in relation to the cyber security cases, the quaran-
tining of online HS can be viewed as an extension of existing 
frameworks for anti-malware protection (Daniel et al. 2019). 
When applied to the HS problem, quarantining is situated 
between the two ethical extremes of entirely permitting or 
entirely prohibiting the posting of certain messages. It ena-
bles the recipients of those messages (or other appropriate 
moderators) to decide (i) whether they wish to read the mes-
sages or not, and (ii) if they decide to read them, whether 
they wish to allow them to be posted or not. If this approach 
were adopted for a HS posting involving S (the Sender), P 
(the Posted message), and R (the Recipient), then the main 
steps in the process would be as follows:
It is helpful to consider a concrete example. The Ameri-
can skier, Gus Kenworthy, came out as gay in October 2015 
(Fig.  5). His YouTube channel was subsequently bom-
barded with homophobic slurs. In 2018 he posted a video 
on his YouTube channel with the caption ‘Feeling Like a 
Champion’, and it received many responses including the 
following:
As discussed in “The regulation of online hate speech” 
section, there are currently very few immediate constraints 
on what anonymous users can post (Fig. 6). Consequently, 
the damage caused by HS of this kind is potentially instanta-
neous: it appears as soon as S sends it, and R can potentially 
read it immediately. There is no mechanism by which R can 
decide whether or not to read the post. There is no buffer 
zone. As Charles R. Lawrence emphasised as long ago as 
Lawrence (1990), ‘[t]he experience of being called “nigger,” 
“spic,” “Jap,” or “kike” is like receiving a slap in the face. 
The injury is instantaneous’ (p. 452).
By contrast, if quarantining were deployed in these cases, 
and if a given P were automatically identified as constituting 
HS, then R would receive an alert such as the following:
R could then decide whether or not to read the post after 
seeing who has written it (e.g., ‘White Dragon’) and after 
being informed that it has been specifically flagged up 
as potentially constituting homophobic HS. R could also 
receive an indication of the degree of severity of the post 
by the value specified on the Hate O’Meter graphic. This 
value can easily be generated from the confidence scores 
(continuous values in the interval [0,1]) produced by the 
automated HS detection system. ‘0’ means that the post is 
not harmful in any way, ‘1’ means that the post is extremely 
harmful/offensive.
As the above summary indicates, quarantining processes 
function in the intermediary ethical space between more 
extreme libertarian and authoritarian approaches. During 
quarantining, potentially offensive social media posts are 
neither entirely permitted nor entirely prohibited. Instead, 
they are held in limbo for a finite period until they have been 
appropriately assessed by the relevant recipients or mod-
erators. A framework of this kind offers a better balance 
between positive and negative liberty (to use Isiah Berlin’s 
well-worn distinction) than current conventions (Berlin 
Fig. 4  The quarantining process 
for HS
S submits P
P ≈ HS P quarantined R alerted
P not posted
P posted
P ≠ HS P posted
Fig. 5  Example of homophobic HS directed at American skier, Gus 
Kenworthy, on YouTube. Source https ://www.youtu be.com
Fig. 6  Homophobic HS shown in Fig.  5 quarantined and provided 
with a graphic indicating degree of severity of the post
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1969). While senders are still free to write whatever they 
wish (positive liberty), the recipients have the opportunity to 
decide which kinds of messages they wish to receive (nega-
tive liberty). The framework also offers various options con-
cerning the degree to which this safeguarding is applied. 
The following implementation methods are just three of the 
numerous possibilities, and, as before, each scenario involve 
S posting the message P of which R is the direct recipient:
• The Bipartite Method: S and R (and no one else) receive 
an HS alert; if they both consent to the message appear-
ing, then P becomes visible for all other indirect recipi-
ents to read.
• The Multipartite Method: even if S and R consent to post 
P, all other users (the indirect recipients) receive the alert 
when they first encounter P, and they can only access the 
contents if they give their consent.
• The Elective Method: all users can specify the degree 
of online HS protection they desire. For instance, in a 
settings file they can specify that they want to be safe-
guarded from, say, racist HS, and/or homophobic HS, 
and/or sexist HS, and so on—or simply from all kinds of 
HS. Consequently, users will receive alerts for any P that 
falls into one of the HS subtypes from which they have 
chosen to be protected.
Clearly, these options involve different degrees of ‘fric-
tion’, where, in IT-related discourse, ‘friction’ denotes any 
process that prevents users/customers accessing as rapidly 
as possible the goods or services they require. For instance, 
having to select answers from pop-up windows, having to fill 
in sign-up forms, failing to find relevant product specifica-
tion information, and encountering long load times—these 
are all examples of online friction. Such experiences may 
annoy users, and, in extreme cases, cause them to change 
to other service providers (Facebook 2019c). Consequently, 
for many AICT developers, zero-friction systems are self-
evidently an ideal. However, it should be clear from the 
preceding discussion that there are numerous situations in 
which some friction is highly desirable. Although social 
media platforms have generally tried to facilitate low-friction 
interactions (e.g., making it as quick and easy as possible to 
upload and/or share photos, audio files, documents, mes-
sages), there are situations in which this can be problemati-
cal. Adopting a high-level perspective, the Bipartite Method 
has the least total friction since only two users encounter 
the HS-related alert, while The Multipartite Method has 
the greatest total friction since all users encounter the alert. 
Crucially, in the case of The Elective Method, the degree 
of personal friction is chosen by each user individually. In 
essence they become ‘voluntary consumers’ of it, and the 
users freely opt for a degree of friction (Sumner et al. 2011, 
p. 18). This does not prevent them subsequently asking the 
service provider to remove the HS content (as is currently 
the case), but it does give them more control over whether 
or not they access that potentially harmful content in the first 
place. In all of these cases, the friction itself could function 
as a deterrent, since it is more tiresome for S to post HS 
if doing so constantly triggers an alert that S subsequently 
has to process. The same procedure could also apply to the 
retweeting and automatic forwarding of potentially harmful 
messages, since the content of those messages could also be 
detected automatically and an alert prompted.
These matters are of some importance because, inevita-
bly, there are so many different scenarios in which quarantin-
ing methods could be deployed. Before considering some of 
these in more detail, we will distinguish formally between a 
Direct Recipient (DR) of a post (i.e., a person to whom the 
message is purposefully sent) and an Indirect Recipient (IR) 
(i.e., a person who might come across the post on a social 
media feed even though he or she was not a DR). In some 
situations, there is only one S and one DR (e.g., a 1-to-1 
Facebook Messenger post), but in other situations there can 
be multiple DRs and IRs. Given this, consider the two fol-
lowing cases:
• Case 1: S is a neo-Nazi. S seeks to post anti-Semitic 
HS on his own public social media feed (i.e., S = DR). S 
receives an alert and consents to the message appearing; 
therefore, the message is posted and can be viewed by 
IRs who happen to read S’s feed.
• Case 2: S and DR are both neo-Nazis. S seeks to post 
anti-Semitic HS on DR’s public social media feed. S and 
DR both receive an alert and consent to the post; there-
fore, the message is posted and can be viewed by IRs who 
happen to read DR’s feed.
In these cases, the S and the DR are both wish to propa-
gate HS, therefore they always give their consent when the 
intended post triggers an alert. The concerns potentially 
arise when the IRs are considered. Even though an IR volun-
tarily chooses to view someone else’s social media feed, that 
person may still be offended by a certain post encountered 
there. This is why Twitter has introduced a warning concern-
ing ‘sensitive content’ (see Fig. 7). If a user’s feed is already 
known to potentially include such material (even though 
it is not entirely clear how ‘sensitive’ should be defined), 
the entire page may be blocked initially, and it will only be 
released if specifically requested by the viewer.
How a quarantining system handles these cases would 
depend on the implementation method adopted. If either 
the Multipartite or Elective Methods were adopted, then 
IRs who had chosen to be fully protected from HS would 
receive an alert, and could then decide whether or not to 
view the posted message. In practice, the system could be 
implemented in a similar manner as Parental Guidance 
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Locks on internet streaming/catch-up services such as 
BBC iPlayer (2019). In other words, parents could set up 
a social media account for their child and specify appro-
priate HS protection levels. If an alert were triggered, 
then the parents could enter a password to access and 
assess the quarantined post, to determine whether or not 
it should be posted on their child’s social media feed.
While the emphasis so far in this discussion has fallen 
exclusively on HS, it is important to recognise that 
extremist groups often deploy a wide range of linguistic 
strategies when seeking to attract and recruit followers 
who may be sympathetic to their ideologies—and HS is 
only a part of this. Indeed, more subtle and complex tech-
niques may not display explicit HS properties at all, the 
use of positive, euphemistic, and/or more abstract rhetoric 
may appeal to potential adherents just as effectively as 
HS. For instance, the terrorist group ISIS frequently used 
triumphant terminology like ‘brothers rise up’ and ‘claim 
victory’ in their recruitment strategies on social media 
(see, e.g., Awan 2017), while the controversial British 
far-right activist Tommy Robinson has repeatedly claimed 
he is attacking the ‘fascist ideology’ of Islam rather than 
Muslims specifically (Union Magazine 2015). Clearly, 
the recruitment functions of such discourses need to be 
examined attentively, and their diverse and multifaceted 
nature goes far beyond the specific task of HS detection 
for the purposes of quarantining.
Conclusion
This article has explored the problem of online text-based 
HS, and the ethical implications of the various strategies 
for dealing with this problematical phenomenon have been 
discussed. The current  TL2 regulatory frameworks were 
described, and some of the problems resulting from this 
kind of reactive self-regulation were outlined. Crucially, 
it was suggested that they are undesirably ineffectual, 
especially when viewed from a patient-oriented ethical 
perspective. State-of-the-art methods for the automatic 
detection and classification of HS were then summarised, 
before the main emphasis shifted to the way in which these 
technologies might eventually be used when their perfor-
mance has improved. In particular, quarantining has been 
explored as a viable approach that strikes an appropriate 
balance between libertarian and authoritarian tendencies. 
In this framework, HS is treated like a form of malware, 
and while the senders of the HS are not censored in a 
crude unilateral matter, the recipients of the HS are given 
the agency to determine how they wish to handle the HS 
they have received. This approach potentially preserves 
freedom of expression, but the harm caused by HS is still 
controlled in a safe fashion by those most directly affected.
Fig. 7  Twitter warning and temporary blocking of user’s feed (names and images redacted by authors. Source https ://twitt er.com
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The need to consider the various available strategies for 
handling online HS has never been more urgent. The UK 
government has recently stated explicitly that.
By designing safer and more secure online products 
and services, the tech sector can equip all companies 
and users with better tools to tackle online harms. We 
want the UK to be a world-leader in the development 
of online safety technology and to ensure companies of 
all sizes have access to, and adopt, innovative solutions 
to improve the safety of their users. (HM Government 
2019, p. 77)
Given this, the importance of technological infrastruc-
tures that can facilitate the development of safer and more 
ethical online products should be all too apparent. And han-
dling online HS convincingly and effectively is simply one 
part of a complex whole.
It is crucial to recognise, though, that the various methods 
considered in this article are all entirely text based. That is, 
they rely on sequences of (written) words being analysed in 
ways that enable the detection and classification of HS to be 
accomplished automatically. Recognising this, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that online communication is frequently 
and increasingly multimodal, rather than monomodal. Mul-
timodality Studies has emerged over the last 20 years or 
so, largely due to the pioneering work of theorists such as 
Gunther Kress, Carey Jewitt, Jeff Bezemer, and Theo van 
Leeuven. Therefore, it is now widely accepted that different 
modes (e.g., image, writing, gesture, music) have different 
semiotic affordances (e.g., the materials the image is made 
from, the syntax of written language), and that these are 
orchestrated by meaning-makers to form multimodal ensem-
bles. For instance, an online advert might contain moving 
images, written text, background music, a spoken voice-over, 
and so on—and these all combine to convey the meaning 
of the advert.7 One inevitable consequence of multimodal 
approaches to meaning making is that language is necessar-
ily displaced from a position of centrality in the analytical 
framework. It loses its privileged status as the primary agent 
of meaning making, and becomes merely one of many pos-
sible ways of creating and communicating semantic content. 
This obviously creates problems for automated HS-detection 
systems that are exclusively text based. For example, con-
sider the following (notorious) meme, which was posted on 
Facebook in 2013 (see Fig. 8). It was not removed, despite 
requests from users, even though images of women breast-
feeding were removed (Bates 2013). 
This blatantly misogynistic meme combines the modes 
of image and writing, and the offensive nature of the whole 
arises from the juxtaposition of the parts. Taken in isolation, 
the text is not necessarily problematical: it is not inherently 
sexist in-and-of itself, and, in certain contexts, it could pre-
sumably constitute benignly humorous advice about sexual 
health and family planning. However, when presented with 
this particular image, the meaning of the text changes, and 
the violently misogynistic, connotations become apparent. 
Nonetheless, the multimodal character of the whole means 
that no current text-based HS-detection systems would 
classify the meme as being an instance of HS. Despite the 
conspicuous nature of this problem, research programmes 
focused on multimodal approaches to HS detection and clas-
sification have only just started to emerge (Hosseinmardi 
et al. 2015; Zhong et al. 2016).8 Clearly, there is much that 
remains to be accomplished.
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